European moves against Google are about protecting companies, not consumers

亚洲抗击谷歌的位移目的在于保卫安全其集团,而非消费者

ALTHOUGH no company is mentioned by name, it is very clear which
American internet giant the European Parliament has in mind in a
resolution that has been doing the rounds in the run-up to a vote on
November 27th. One draft calls for “unbundling search engines from other
commercial services” to ensure a level playing field for European
companies and consumers. This is the latest and most dramatic outbreak
of Googlephobia in Europe.

虽然如此尚无任何市4的名字被谈起,但很强烈的是欧洲委员会曾经将什么U.S.科学和技术要员放入1一.27号前夕的投票决定中。1项草案呼吁解除寻找引擎与其它国商人业服务的绑定,以担保对南美洲小卖部和买主有八个相持公平的条件。那是新型的,最具戏剧性的北美洲谷歌(谷歌(Google))恐惧症的突发。

Europe’s former competition commissioner, Joaquín Almunia, brokered a
series of settlements this year requiring Google to give more prominence
to rivals’ shopping and map services alongside its own in search
results. But MEPs want his successor, Margrethe Vestager, to take a
firmer line. Hence the calls to dismember the company.

澳洲前竞争委员会委员,Joaqurn
Almunia在当年调护治疗了1连串协议,协议供给google给竞争对手的购物和地图方面提供更多的内容,并将其纳入他和睦的探索结果中。可是欧洲议会会员们期待她们的接班Magrethe
Vestager 采用更有力的法子。强烈呼吁解散公司。

The parliament does not actually have the power to carry out this
threat. But it touches on a question that has been raised by politicians
from Washington to Seoul and brings together all sorts of issues from
privacy to industrial policy (see article). How worrying is the
dominance of the internet by Google and a handful of other firms?

议会倒是未有啥样实际的手艺来实行那壹威慑,不过他接触了一个曾经被从华盛顿到晋州的政客们所建议的难题。被G和其他铺面基本的网络毕竟是有多焦虑?

Who’s afraid of the big bad search engine?

Google (whose executive chairman, Eric Schmidt, is a member of the board
of The Economist’s parent company) has 68% of the market of web searches
in America and more than 90% in many European countries. Like Facebook,
Amazon and other tech giants, it benefits from the network effects
whereby the popularity of a service attracts more users and thus becomes
self-perpetuating. It collects more data than any other company and is
better at mining those data for insights. Once people start using
Google’s search (and its e-mail, maps and digital storage), they rarely
move on. Small advertisers find switching to another platform too
burdensome to bother.

谷歌(其推行董事长埃里克 Schmidit,是法学人母公司的董事)
在United States有%68的web寻找店4,还有%90的商海在重重欧洲国度。像FB,亚马逊(Amazon)和其它的科学和技术巨头同样,通过推广二个事务来诱惑越来越多的用户并因此小编一而再。G搜聚了比其余集团越来越多的数额,且更擅长发掘这个数量及洞察力。1旦人们早先应用谷歌(Google)搜索(还有他的邮件,地图和数字存款和储蓄服务),他们基本不用做什么。小广告商搜索另三个平台则供给做额外的劳作以至于他们接受不住。

Google is clearly dominant, then; but whether it abuses that dominance
is another matter. It stands accused of favouring its own services in
search results, making it hard for advertisers to manage campaigns
across several online platforms, and presenting answers on some search
pages directly rather than referring users to other websites. But its
behaviour is not in the same class as Microsoft’s systematic campaign
against the Netscape browser in the late 1990s: there are no e-mails
talking about “cutting off” competitors’ “air supply”. What’s more, some
of the features that hurt Google’s competitors benefit its consumers.
Giving people flight details, dictionary definitions or a map right away
saves them time. And while advertisers often pay hefty rates for clicks,
users get Google’s service for nothing—rather as plumbers and florists
fork out to be listed in Yellow Pages which are given to readers gratis,
and nightclubs charge men steep entry prices but let women in free.

G明显攻陷主导地位,然则否其在滥用那个主导地位就是另壹遍事了。它被控诉在检索结果中偏袒自身的劳动。使得广告商在一密密麻麻在线平台上的管理调控活动变得紧Baba。并直接在探求页面上提前发送寻找结果而不是指引用户去其余网址。但它这些行为并不与90年间中期的微软自动化活动抵制Netscape浏览器那样:未有电子邮件谈切断竞争对手的气源。越来越多的是有些特点加害到了G的竞争对手从消费者那里获取收益。给众人提供航班音讯,字典释义或地图以不慢节约人的年月。纵然广告商支付非常高的点击利息,那对顾客哪些便宜都未曾——而不像水管工和种花为业的农民花钱呗列在黄页上不收费提须求读者,还有夜总会供给男生付门票而女人则无需

There are also good reasons why governments should regulate internet
monopolies less energetically than offline ones. First, barriers to
entry are lower in the digital realm. It has never been easier to launch
a new online product or service: consider the rapid rise of Instagram,
WhatsApp or Slack. Building a rival infrastructure to a physical
incumbent is far more expensive (just ask telecoms operators or energy
firms), and as a result there is much less competition (and more need
for regulation) in the real world. True, big firms can always buy
upstart rivals (as Facebook did with Instagram and WhatsApp, and Google
did with Waze, Apture and many more). But such acquisitions then
encourage the formation of even more start-ups, creating even more
competition for incumbents.

有众多理由解释为何政党应当花越来越少了活力规范互连网垄断(monopoly)而非线下。首先,进入数字世界的路子低。平素不曾那样轻巧推出多个在线的产品或服务:想想看快捷兴起的推特(Twitter),WahtsApp或Slack。建设2个可与之平分秋色的功底设备到其成型则更进一步高昂(只管去问邮电通讯运行商或能源集团)。并且它们在现实世界中有更加少的竞争者(并必要越多的管理调控)。讲真,大厂家平日能收购新兴竞争对手(就像FB对Ins和WhatsApp所做的那么),可是那种收购反而鼓励了越多出创集团的朝三暮4,对现成公司形成更加多的竞争。

Second, although switching from Google and other online giants is not
costless, their products do not lock customers in as Windows,
Microsoft’s operating system, did. And although network effects may
persist for a while, they do not confer a lasting advantage: consider
the decline of MySpace, or more recently of Orkut, Google’s
once-dominant social network in Brazil, both eclipsed by Facebook—itself
threatened by a wave of messaging apps.

能源公司,说不上,从google和其余厂商里选用的代价比较少,他们的产品并没有像Windows那样锁住顾客。固然其互连网影响会持续存在一段时间,但它并不曾授予持久的优势:.……略….

Finally, the lesson of recent decades is that technology monopolists
(think of IBM in mainframes or Microsoft in PC operating systems) may be
dominant for a while, but they are eventually toppled when they fail to
move with the times, or when new technologies expand the market in
unexpected ways, exposing them to new rivals. Facebook is eating into
Google’s advertising revenue. Despite the success of Android, Google’s
mobile platform, the rise of smartphones may undermine Google: users now
spend more time on apps than on the web, and Google is gradually losing
control of Android as other firms build their own mobile ecosystems on
top of its open-source underpinnings. So far, no company has remained
information technology’s top dog from one cycle to the next. Sometimes
former monopolies end up with a lucrative franchise in a legacy area, as
Microsoft and IBM have. But the kingdoms they rule turn out to be only
part of a much larger map.

最后,近10年的经验教训是能力操纵可能会基本1段时间,不过他们最后会暴光给本身的挑战者当他俩未与时俱进,或是当新能力以意外的不贰秘诀扩大团结的商海

Looking after their own

管好你自身

The European Parliament’s Googlephobia looks a mask for two concerns,
one worthier than the other. The lamentable one, which American
politicians pointed out this week, is a desire to protect European
companies. Among the loudest voices lobbying against Google are Axel
Springer and Hubert Burda Media, two German media giants. Instead of
attacking successful American companies, Europe’s leaders should ask
themselves why their continent has not produced a Google or a Facebook.
Opening up the EU’s digital services market would do more to create one
than protecting local incumbents.

亚洲的谷歌(谷歌)恐惧症就就如二个面具,一面比另一面更有价值。不过美利坚合作国政客们在本周提议,可悲的一面是其欲保养欧洲商厦,在反对G的游说团体中发声最大的是Ake塞尔-施普林格(施普林格出版集团总组长)和休伯特Burda(德意志传媒大亨)这三个媒体大亨。亚洲大王应该反思本身为什么他们的大州从没出现像谷歌和FB一样公司,而不是攻击美利坚同盟友的成功的商号。开放亚洲的数字市集将有主于创设那样(G/FB/Ama)的商家而非爱慕地点有名公司。

The good reason for worrying about the internet giants is privacy. It is
right to limit the ability of Google and Facebook to use personal data:
their services should, for instance, come with default settings guarding
privacy, so companies gathering personal information have to ask
consumers to opt in. Europe’s politicians have shown more interest in
this than American ones. But to address these concerns, they should
regulate companies’ behaviour, not their market power. Some clearer
thinking by European politicians would benefit the continent’s citizens.

忧郁网络巨头的1个根本原由是隐秘。限制G和FB使用私人数据的权柄是无可厚非的:如,他们的服务应该私下认可带有隐秘尊敬,所以公司在采纳私人数据时应告知客户寻得许可。亚洲的政客们在那方面展现出比美政客们越来越多的兴味,但要表示那一个驰念,他们应该标准集团的作为,而不是宏观调整市镇。亚洲政客们深思熟虑将会便宜于澳洲的公民。​

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